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OPINION 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Sunoco, Inc. appeals from the District Court’s denial of 
its motion to compel arbitration, arguing that Donald White, 
who brought this lawsuit against Sunoco alleging fraud on 
behalf of a putative class, must arbitrate his claims pursuant to 
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a credit card agreement that White signed with a third party 
who is not named in the lawsuit.  At issue in this appeal is 
whether Sunoco, a non-signatory to the credit card agreement 
and who is not mentioned in the agreement, can compel White 
to arbitrate.  After examining the relevant state law and 
applying it to the facts here, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 
 
I. 
 
Appellant Sunoco is a Pennsylvania corporation that 
markets and sells gasoline through approximately 4,900 retail 
operations in 26 states.  This lawsuit involves the “Sunoco 
Rewards Program,” which Sunoco advertised through various 
promotional materials.  The Sunoco Rewards Program offered 
customers who buy gas at Sunoco locations using a Citibank-
issued credit card (the “Sunoco Rewards Card”) a 5-cent per 
gallon discount either at the pump or on their monthly billing 
statements.  The promotional materials included a “Terms and 
Conditions of Offer” sheet, indicating that Citibank, N.A. is the 
issuer of the Sunoco Rewards Card.  Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 
45, 52.  They also stated that approval for the card was 
dependent on meeting Citibank’s creditworthiness criteria and 
that by applying for the card, the applicant authorized Citibank 
to “share with Sunoco® and its affiliates experiential and 
transactional information regarding your activity with us.”  
J.A. 52.  Finally, the promotion explained, “When you become 
a cardmember, you will receive the full Sunoco Rewards Card 
Program Terms and Conditions, which may change at any time 
for any reason upon thirty (30) days prior written notice.”  Id.  
Although Sunoco and White disagree as to whether Sunoco 
and Citibank jointly marketed the credit card, it is undisputed 
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that Sunoco was not a corporate affiliate of and had no 
ownership interest in Citibank and vice versa.  
 
Appellant White is a Florida resident who applied for 
and obtained a Sunoco Rewards Card from Citibank in 2013.  
He made fuel purchases with the card at various Sunoco-
branded gas station locations.  White alleges that “[c]ontrary to 
its clear and express representations, Sunoco does not apply a 
5¢/gallon discount on all fuel purchases made by cardholders 
at every Sunoco location.  Sunoco omits this material 
information to induce customers to sign-up for the Sunoco 
Rewards Credit Card so they frequent Sunoco locations.”  J.A. 
31.  White avers that but for the representations regarding the 
5-cent per gallon discount, he “would not have become [a] 
Sunoco Credit Card cardholder[] and/or would have purchased 
gasoline at cheaper prices and/or elsewhere.”  J.A. 37.  He 
brings claims of fraud and fraudulent inducement, negligent 
misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and violation of the 
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.  White’s 
claims are against Sunoco only, and he alleges no misconduct 
by Citibank.1 
 
                                              
1 Before bringing this action, White communicated with the 
Citibank customer service department several times regarding 
the status of fuel discount credits that he claims he was entitled 
to but did not receive.  White alleges that on several occasions, 
Citibank told him that “[u]nfortunately, not all stations honor 
the discount as they are independently owned and operated.”  
J.A. 252; see also J.A. 31.  White acknowledges that Citibank 
did credit his account to some extent after he complained. 
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White’s Sunoco Rewards Card is governed by a Card 
Agreement, which he received when he first obtained the card 
from Citibank and again when he requested additional copies 
of the agreement from Citibank on April 30, 2014 and June 1, 
2015.  The Card Agreement explicitly states that “we, us, and 
our mean Citibank, N.A., the issuer of your account” and that 
“you, your, and yours mean the person who applied to open 
this account.”  J.A. 88.   
 
It is undisputed that Sunoco is not a signatory to the 
Card Agreement, to which White and Citibank are the only 
parties.  The Card Agreement does not mention the word 
“Sunoco”; it also makes no mention of the 5-cent per gallon 
discount.  However, the account statements mailed to White 
bear the Sunoco logo and include e-mail and mailing 
information for Sunoco.  The Card Agreement also contains a 
“Governing Law and Enforcing Our Rights” section that states 
that the “terms and enforcement” of the agreement are 
governed by “[f]ederal law and the law of South Dakota, where 
[Citibank is] located.”  J.A. 92. 
 
Sunoco filed a motion to compel arbitration based on 
the arbitration clause contained in the Card Agreement.  The 
arbitration clause provides in relevant part, 
 
PLEASE READ THIS PROVISION OF THE 
AGREEMENT CAREFULLY. IT PROVIDES 
THAT ANY DISPUTE MAY BE 
RESOLVED BY BINDING ARBITRATION.  
ARBITRATION REPLACES THE RIGHT 
TO GO TO COURT, INCLUDING THE 
RIGHT TO A JURY AND THE RIGHT TO 
INITIATE OR PARTICIPATE IN A CLASS 
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ACTION OR SIMILAR PROCEEDING. IN 
ARBITRATION, A DISPUTE IS 
RESOLVED BY AN ARBITRATOR 
INSTEAD OF A JUDGE OR JURY. 
ARBITRATION PROCEDURES ARE 
SIMPLER AND MORE LIMITED THAN 
COURT PROCEDURES. 
 
Agreement to Arbitrate: Either you or we may, 
without the other’s consent, elect mandatory, 
binding arbitration for any claim, dispute, or 
controversy between you and us (called 
“Claims”). 
 
J.A. 91.  The arbitration clause also defined the claims that are 
subject to arbitration as those “relating to your account, a prior 
related account, or our relationship . . . including Claims 
regarding the application, enforceability, or interpretation of 
this Agreement and this arbitration provision.”  Id.  The 
provision adds that relevant claims are subject to arbitration 
“no matter what legal theory they are based on or what remedy 
. . . they seek.”  Id.  Finally, a paragraph titled “Whose Claims 
are subject to arbitration?” states, “[n]ot only ours and yours, 
but also claims made by or against anyone connected with us 
or you or claiming through us or you, such as a co-applicant or 
authorized user of your account, an employee, agent, 
representative, affiliated company, predecessor or successor, 
heir, assignee, or trustee in bankruptcy” are subject to 
arbitration.  Id.  The arbitration provision also sets forth the 
steps for invoking arbitration:  “At any time you or we may ask 
an appropriate court to compel arbitration of Claims, or to stay 
the litigation of Claims pending arbitration, even if such 
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Claims are part of a lawsuit, unless a trial has begun or a final 
judgment has been entered.”2  Id. 
 
 The District Court denied Sunoco’s motion to compel 
arbitration.  The court began its analysis by noting that 
“traditional principles of state law allow a contract to be 
enforced by or against nonparties to the contract” and that such 
principles apply to arbitration agreements.  J.A. 11 (quoting 
Griswold v. Coventry First LLC, 762 F.3d 264, 271 (3d Cir. 
2014)).  It determined that it would apply Third Circuit 
authority on compelling arbitration, explaining that neither 
party raised choice-of-law issues, and that it believed the 
outcome would be the same regardless of which law the court 
applied.   
 
 Examining the arbitration provision itself, the District 
Court observed that there was no dispute as to the validity of 
the provision and that the provision could only be enforced by 
signatories to it unless contract, agency, or estoppel principles 
dictated otherwise.  The District Court examined all three and 
determined that none applied.  It concluded that as to contract 
and agency law, Sunoco was not a third-party beneficiary of 
the Cardholder Agreement and its arbitration provision, and 
that Sunoco was not an agent, owner, or subsidiary of Citibank 
or vice versa.  As to estoppel, the District Court concluded that 
the two-part “alternative estoppel” test discussed in E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin 
Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2001), was not 
                                              
2 Citibank registered the arbitration clause of this agreement 
with the American Arbitration Association as the “Citibank 
Cards Standard Arbitration Agreement.”  J.A. 33841.   
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met because 1) there was no close relationship between Sunoco 
and Citibank, and 2) the claims alleged against Sunoco did not 
relate to the terms or obligations in the Cardholder Agreement.  
Finally, the District Court rejected Sunoco’s argument that 
because White had benefitted from the Cardholder Agreement, 
he should be estopped from bypassing its arbitration clause in 
this suit.  The District Court reasoned that because a dispute 
that arises under the Cardholder Agreement is distinct from any 
dispute arising from a separate agreement with Sunoco, the 
estoppel principle does not apply to White. 
 
 Sunoco timely appealed. 
 
II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d).  Our appellate jurisdiction over the District 
Court’s denial of Sunoco’s motion to compel arbitration 
derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B).  See Griswold, 762 F.3d at 
268.  “We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
order on a motion to compel arbitration.”  Flintkote Co. v. 
Aviva PLC, 769 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2014).  We use the 
standard for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(a) when reviewing the underlying motion 
“because the district court’s order compelling arbitration is in 
effect a summary disposition of the issue of whether or not 
there had been a meeting of the minds on the agreement to 
arbitrate.”  Id. (quoting Century Indem. Co. v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 584 F.3d 513, 528 (3d Cir. 
2009)).  Thus, a motion to compel arbitration should only be 
granted if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and, after viewing facts and drawing inferences in favor of the 
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non-moving party, the party moving to compel is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Id.  We note that under the FAA, 
“the presumption of arbitrability applies only where an 
arbitration agreement is ambiguous about whether it covers the 
dispute at hand.  Otherwise, the plain language of the contract 
holds.”  CardioNet, Inc. v. Cigna Health Corp., 751 F.3d 165, 
173 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 
 
III. 
 
The key issue in this case is whether Sunoco, as a non-
signatory to the Card Agreement and its arbitration clause, can 
compel White to arbitrate.  The Supreme Court explained in 
Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle that “‘traditional principles’ 
of state law allow a contract to be enforced by or against 
nonparties through ‘assumption, piercing the corporate veil, 
alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary 
theories, waiver and estoppel.’”  556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009) 
(quoting 21 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 57:19 (4th ed. 
2001)); see also Crawford Prof’l Drugs, Inc. v. CVS Caremark 
Corp., 748 F.3d 249, 261–62 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[P]rior decisions 
allowing non-signatories to compel arbitration based on federal 
common law, rather than state contract law . . . have been 
modified to conform with Arthur Andersen.”).   
 
Sunoco argues that equitable estoppel prevents White 
from refusing arbitration against it as a non-signatory.3  The 
Arthur Andersen Court held that a non-party to an arbitration 
agreement may invoke section 3 of the FAA for a stay in 
                                              
3 Sunoco does not challenge the District Court’s conclusion that 
third-party beneficiary theory and agency theory were invalid 
bases for Sunoco to compel White to arbitrate.   
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federal court if the relevant state law allows a non-signatory to 
enforce the arbitration agreement against a signatory.  556 U.S. 
at 632.4 
                                              
4 The parties appear to rely on DuPont, 269 F.3d 187, for a 
federal rule of equitable or “alternative” estoppel that binds a 
signatory to arbitrate against its will with a non-signatory.  See 
White Br. 24; Sunoco Br. 30; J.A. 17 (citing DuPont for the 
principle that, “Under the ‘alternative estoppel’ theory, a non-
signatory may seek enforcement [of an arbitration clause 
against a non-signatory] when it can show: 1) there is a close 
relationship between it and a signatory; and 2) the alleged 
wrongs are related to a non-signatory’s contractual obligations 
and duties.”).  This reliance is ill-placed, as we did not adopt a 
rule regarding alternative estoppel in DuPont.  We decline to 
do so here because the Supreme Court in Arthur Andersen has 
rejected the analysis referenced in DuPont, which rested on 
federal law.  In DuPont, we had no occasion to adopt or reject 
a standard, but merely observed that other Courts of Appeals 
have employed an “alternative estoppel” theory when “a non-
signatory voluntarily pierces its own veil to arbitrate claims 
against a signatory that are derivative of its corporate-subsidy’s 
claims against the same signatory.”  DuPont, 269 F.3d at 201 
(“Appellants recognize that these cases bind a signatory[,] not 
a non-signatory to arbitration, but argue that this is a distinction 
without a difference.  They are wrong.”).  We reinforced our 
observation about alternative estoppel theory in Griswold 
before concluding that such a theory is “inapplicable because 
our case involves a signatory . . . attempting to bind a 
nonsignatory . . . to the arbitration clause, rather than the 
inverse.”  762 F.3d at 272.   
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To choose which state law will apply, “a federal court 
sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-law rules of the 
forum state.”  LeJeune v. Bliss-Salem, Inc., 85 F.3d 1069, 1071 
(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 
313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)).  The forum state is Pennsylvania 
because the action was brought in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  However, neither Sunoco nor White argued in 
their briefs which state’s law regarding equitable estoppel 
should apply under Pennsylvania choice-of-law provisions.  At 
oral argument, they did agree that Pennsylvania law does not 
apply.5  Sunoco’s attorney took the position that South Dakota 
law applies, while White’s attorney stated that Florida law 
applies.6  Oral Arg. Tr. 11:4045; 23:1026.  Under 
                                              
5 The equitable estoppel rule in Pennsylvania is essentially the 
same as the test described in DuPont:  “‘non-signatories to an 
arbitration agreement can enforce such an agreement when 
there is an obvious and close nexus between the non-
signatories and the contract or the contracting parties’ . . . [and 
if] claims against [the non-signatory] are inextricably entwined 
with the Contract.”  Elwyn v. DeLuca, 48 A.3d 457, 463 (Pa. 
Super. 2012) (quoting Dodds v. Pulte Home Corp., 909 A.2d 
348, 351 (Pa. Super. 2006)).  Even under Pennsylvania law, 
Sunoco’s argument would still fail for substantially the same 
reasons the District Court advanced.  
6 While the Card Agreement’s choice-of-law clause requires 
that the terms of the agreement itself be governed by South 
Dakota law, it is not immediately obvious whether the issue of 
equitable estoppel would be determined by that clause, 
especially since Citibank — which drafted the choice-of-law 
clause and is located in South Dakota — is not party to this 
dispute. 
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Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law analysis, we examine whether 
“the laws of the two jurisdictions would produce the same 
result on the particular issue presented.”  Berg Chilling Sys., 
Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 462 (3d Cir. 2006).  If the 
results would be the same, there is no actual conflict and we 
“should avoid the choice-of-law question.”  Id.  We thus 
examine whether the laws of Florida and South Dakota 
regarding equitable estoppel would produce the same result in 
this case.  We conclude that they do. 
 
Under South Dakota law, a signatory can be forced to 
arbitrate against a non-signatory under principles of equitable 
estoppel in either of two circumstances.  The first is when “all 
the claims against the nonsignatory defendants are based on 
alleged substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct 
by both the nonsignatories and one or more of the signatories 
to the contract.”  Rossi Fine Jewelers, Inc. v. Gunderson, 648 
N.W.2d 812, 815 (S.D. 2002) (citing MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. 
Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999)).  The reasoning 
behind this rule is that plaintiffs should not be able to “avoid 
the arbitration for which [they] had contracted simply by 
adding a nonsignatory defendant.”  Id. (alteration in original) 
(quoting Cosmotek Mumessillik Ve Ticaret Ltd. Sirkketi v. 
Cosmotek USA, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 757, 759 (D. Conn. 1996)).  
Second, a signatory can also be compelled to arbitrate against 
a non-signatory under South Dakota law when it asserts 
“claims arising out of agreements against nonsignatories to 
those agreements without allowing those defendants also to 
invoke the arbitration clause contained in the agreements.”  Id. 
(alterations omitted) (quoting A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc. v. 
McMahon, 697 F. Supp. 488, 494 (N.D. Ga. 1988)); see also 
MS Dealer, 177 F.3d at 947.  In other words, a plaintiff-
signatory cannot have his cake (use the agreement against the 
 13 
 
non-signatory) and eat it too (avoid enforcement of the 
arbitration clause within the agreement). 
 
Although the Florida Supreme Court has not opined on 
equitable estoppel in the arbitration enforcement context, we 
“predict how it would rule if faced with the issue.”  Spence v. 
ESAB Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  We look 
to “‘decisions of intermediate appellate courts, of federal 
courts interpreting that state’s law, and of other state supreme 
courts that addressed the issue,’ as well as to ‘analogous 
decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works, and any other 
reliable data tending convincingly to show how the highest 
court in the state would decide the issue at hand.’”  Id. at 216–
17 (quoting Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Basell USA Inc., 512 F.3d 
86, 92 (3d Cir. 2008)).  We are convinced that the Florida 
Supreme Court would adopt the same rules as South Dakota, 
as three of the five intermediate state appellate courts in Florida 
have had occasion to review the issue and adopted the same 
rules.  See Heller v. Blue Aerospace, LLC, 112 So. 3d 635, 637 
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Perdido Key Island Resort Dev., 
L.L.P. v. Regions Bank, 102 So. 3d 1, 6 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
2012); Armas v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 842 So. 2d 210, 212 (Fla. 
3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 
  A non-signatory may enforce an arbitration clause 
against a signatory under Florida law in either of two 
circumstances.  First, “[e]quitable estoppel is warranted when 
the signatory to the contract containing the arbitration clause 
raises allegations of concerted conduct by both the non-
signatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.”  
Armas, 842 So. 2d at 212 (adopting the rule set forth in MS 
Dealer, 177 F.3d at 947, as the South Dakota Supreme Court 
had done); see also Perdido, 102 So. 3d at 6; Heller, 112 So. 3d 
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at 637.  Second, a plaintiff may be “equitably estopped from 
avoiding arbitration with [a non-signatory defendant] when the 
claims stem from the same contractual obligation as [the 
plaintiff] is relying on . . . .”  Armas, 842 So. 2d at 212.  The 
rationale behind this rule is to “prevent a plaintiff from relying 
on a contract when it works to his advantage and repudiating it 
when it works to his disadvantage by requiring arbitration.”  Id. 
(citing In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971 
(11th Cir. 2002)). 
 
To summarize:  both South Dakota and Florida courts 
would apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent a 
signatory from avoiding arbitration against a non-signatory in 
two circumstances.  First, if a plaintiff-signatory alleges 
concerted conduct on the part of both the non-signatory and 
another signatory, that plaintiff may be equitably estopped 
from avoiding arbitration with the non-signatory.  Second, if a 
plaintiff-signatory asserts a claim against a defendant based on 
an agreement, that plaintiff may be equitably estopped from 
avoiding arbitration on the basis that the defendant was not a 
signatory to that same agreement.  Neither circumstance is 
applicable in this case. 
 
We hold that White cannot be forced to arbitrate under 
principles of equitable estoppel under either South Dakota or 
Florida law.  First, there is no alleged “concerted conduct” or 
misconduct on the part of Sunoco and Citibank.  See Armas, 
842 So. 2d at 212; Rossi, 648 N.W.2d at 815.  While Sunoco 
contends that White strategically withheld allegations against 
Citibank, and that the “[p]laintiff artfully pleaded his claim to 
assert a fraudulent inducement theory against Sunoco alone” in 
order to connect the claims against Sunoco to the Cardholder 
Agreement, Sunoco Br. 34, 4345, such assertions are 
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unfounded.  We decline to speculate as to whether White has 
some related grievance against Citibank and to compel White 
to arbitrate based on that speculation.  Further, there is nothing 
in the record to suggest that Citibank engaged in any concerted 
misconduct with Sunoco regarding the 5-cent per gallon 
discount.  Sunoco’s suggestion that Citibank’s participation in 
approving card applications and calculating statement credits 
somehow constitutes concerted misconduct is also unfounded.  
Moreover, the fact that Citibank provided credits to White after 
he complained does not establish concerted misconduct 
between Citibank and Sunoco.   
 
We also disagree with Sunoco’s characterization of this 
case as akin to one alleging that the entire Card Agreement, 
including the arbitration agreement, is the product of fraud.  
See Sunoco Br. 34 (citing Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. 
Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, 387 F.2d 768, 771 (3d Cir. 1967)).  This 
is not the case here because White is not launching a “general 
attack on a contract for fraud” or arguing that “if fraud is 
proven[,] the entire contract, including the arbitration 
provision, would fall.”  Merritt-Chapman, 387 F.2d at 771.  
White’s claims against Sunoco do not impinge on the integrity 
of the Card Agreement between White and Citibank.  Further, 
Sunoco cannot draw a relationship between the fraud claims 
and the Card Agreement where White has not alleged any. 
 
Second, the claims that White asserts against Sunoco do 
not rely on any terms in the Card Agreement; White is 
therefore not estopped from avoiding arbitration under the 
arbitration clause within the Card Agreement.  We know this 
to be true because even if the Card Agreement contained 
entirely different terms — for example, about the interest rate, 
credit limit, billing address, annual membership fee, foreign 
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transaction fees, payment schedules, credit reporting rules, or 
even the arbitration agreement — that would not have any 
bearing on the validity of White’s claims against Sunoco 
regarding its allegedly fraudulent promise to discount 5 cents 
per gallon of fuel at Sunoco locations.  Accordingly, White 
cannot be required to arbitrate based on the Card Agreement 
under South Dakota or Florida law. 
 
IV. 
 
 We also address two alternative arguments Sunoco 
advances which do not relate to estoppel.  First, Sunoco argues 
that its promotional materials and the Card Agreement must be 
read together as one “integrated whole,” and that this is a basis 
for compelling arbitration.  Second, Sunoco argues that the 
arbitration clause in the Card Agreement requires that White 
arbitrate against “connected” entities, of which Sunoco claims 
it is one.   
 
A. 
 
Sunoco asserts that the District Court erroneously 
concluded that Sunoco’s promotional materials constituted a 
separate contract from the Card Agreement.  Sunoco argues 
that the “the promotional materials and the Sunoco Rewards 
Card Agreement . . . together . . . explain and supply all of the 
key terms of the Sunoco Rewards Card Program,” J.A. 24, and 
therefore form an “integrated whole” contract between White 
and Citibank and Sunoco.  Because of this purported 
“integrated” contract consisting of both the Card Agreement 
and the promotional materials, Sunoco asserts it is entitled to 
invoke the arbitration clause in the Card Agreement despite not 
being a signatory or being mentioned at all.  While we are 
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unconvinced that Sunoco’s argument could ever yield a 
conclusion that all agreed to include Sunoco as a party to the 
arbitration clause, see infra, we begin by concluding that the 
“integrated whole” assertion itself is unfounded.   
 
First, Sunoco’s own representations contradict this 
position and the position taken by our dissenting colleague.  
Sunoco argues that the promotions were “simply an offer to 
receive offers, or more precisely, an invitation for Plaintiff to 
submit an application,” Sunoco Br. 20, and acknowledges that 
a consumer who has been offered a promotional deal has no 
obligations at all.7  It quotes the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 26, which explains that “Advertisements of goods 
. . . are not ordinarily intended or understood as offers to sell.”  
Sunoco Br. 19.  In conceding that the promotions neither 
constituted an offer nor conferred obligations, Sunoco has also 
conceded that there are no terms to “integrate” with the actual 
contract at issue:  the Card Agreement.8   
                                              
7 Sunoco’s argument appears to be solely to refute the District 
Court’s passing mention of a “separate agreement” between 
White and Sunoco in concluding that White should not be held 
to the cardholder agreement when he did not invoke any of its 
terms against Sunoco.  J.A. 1819.  The District Court’s 
analysis of this issue relied upon caselaw regarding estopping 
non-signatories from avoiding arbitration.  We have already 
determined that under the relevant state law regarding 
estopping signatories, Sunoco has failed to meet the standard 
for invoking equitable estoppel regardless of whether there is 
a “separate agreement” between White and Sunoco. 
8 In order for multiple writings to constitute a single agreement 
between parties, the writings “must show, either on its face or 
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Second, Sunoco has advanced no legal basis to suggest 
that the promotional materials are integrated into the Card 
Agreement pursuant to the parol evidence rule or any other 
legal theory.9  Sunoco has identified no ambiguity on the face 
                                              
by reference to some other writing, the contract between the 
parties so that it can be understood without having recourse to 
parol proof.”  Meek v. Briggs, 86 So. 271, 272 (Fla. 1920); see 
also Socarras v. Claughton Hotels, Inc., 374 So. 2d 1057, 1059 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)(“[I]n order for an unsigned writing 
to be used to supply the essential elements of an enforceable 
contract, there must be some reference to that unsigned writing 
in the signed writing.”); Baker v. Wilburn, 456 N.W.2d 304, 
306 (S.D. 1990) (identifying several factors to compel the 
reading of multiple writings as a single contract, including the 
fact that the instruments are “executed at the same time by the 
same parties,” and whether one contract refers to another and 
the parties exclusive to the latter).  The Card Agreement makes 
no reference to Sunoco’s Rewards Program, and the 
promotional materials were neither executed at all nor 
presented contemporaneously with the Card Agreement.   
 
Sunoco’s citation to a non-precedential opinion of ours 
in which we affirmed the District Court’s conclusion that 
contracts which are made for the purposes of a single 
transaction should be read in reference to each other — aside 
from being non-binding, see 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.3 (2015) — is ill-
placed because Sunoco acknowledges that here, the 
promotional materials do not form a contract at all.  See Sunoco 
Br. 20.   
 
9 There is no conflict between Florida and South Dakota law 
regarding the parol evidence rule or other applicable principles, 
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of the Card Agreement that would suggest that parol evidence 
of the promotional materials is admissible to construe the 
meaning of the Card Agreement’s arbitration clause.  See, e.g., 
Pankratz v. Hoff, 806 N.W.2d 231, 236 (S.D. 2011) (noting 
that absent fraud or mistake, “parol testimony of prior or 
contemporaneous negotiations . . . which tend to substitute a 
new and different contract from the one evidenced by the 
writing, is incompetent” (quoting Neal v. Marrone, 79 S.E.2d 
239, 242 (N.C. 1953))); Knabb v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 
144 Fla. 110, 131–32, 197 So. 707, 715 (1940) (“[W]here the 
language of a contract is susceptible to more than one 
construction . . . the court will consider . . . facts and 
circumstances leading up to and attending its execution . . . . 
This rule does not apply, however, where the language of the 
contract leaves no doubt as to the meaning of the parties and in 
such a case the contract is to be construed without regard to 
extraneous facts.”).  There is no evidence of some broader 
contract between all three entities consisting of both the 
promotional materials and the Card Agreement.  The Card 
Agreement is an unambiguous and complete contract between 
White and Citibank; we are aware of no basis for looking 
outside it to search for a broader “contract” with Sunoco.  
Because Sunoco has advanced no colorable argument on this 
front, it cannot compel arbitration. 
 
B. 
 
Sunoco’s final argument is that the Card Agreement’s 
arbitration clause compels White to arbitrate claims against 
                                              
so we need not determine which state’s laws apply.  See Berg 
Chilling, 435 F.3d at 462. 
 20 
 
“connected” entities, of which Sunoco claims it is one.  Sunoco 
points to the portion of the arbitration clause in the Card 
Agreement which defines the claims covered as inclusive of 
those “made by or against anyone connected with us or you or 
claiming through us or you.”  J.A. 91.  Sunoco argues that it is 
“connected with” Citibank as it jointly marketed the Sunoco 
Rewards Card with Citibank.   
 
First, Sunoco’s argument fails because it confuses the 
nature of the claims covered by the arbitration clause with the 
question of who can compel arbitration.  Even if Sunoco is 
“connected” with Citibank and the claims against Sunoco are 
covered claims, that does not give Sunoco the right to elect to 
arbitrate against White.  The arbitration clause of the 
Cardholder Agreement establishes unequivocally that “[e]ither 
you or we may, without the other’s consent, elect mandatory, 
binding arbitration for any claim, dispute, or controversy 
between you and us (called ‘Claims’).”  J.A. 91.  Moreover, the 
clause also provides, “At any time you or we may ask an 
appropriate court to compel arbitration of Claims.”  Id.  The 
Cardholder Agreement defines “you” as the card holder and 
“we” and “us” as Citibank.  J.A. 88.  Nowhere does the 
agreement provide for a third party, like Sunoco, the ability to 
elect arbitration or to move to compel arbitration.   
 
Second, we are skeptical of whether the joint marketing 
campaign between Sunoco and Citibank could make Sunoco a 
“connected” entity under the arbitration clause.10  The 
                                              
10 Per the choice-of-law clause in the Cardholder Agreement, 
we use South Dakota law to interpret the express terms of the 
contract.  See Kruzits v. Okuma Mach. Tool, Inc., 40 F.3d 52, 
55 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Pennsylvania courts generally honor the 
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arbitration clause applies to “Claims made by or against 
anyone connected with us or you or claiming through us or you, 
such as a co-applicant or authorized user of your account, an 
employee, agent, representative, affiliated company, 
predecessor or successor, heir, assignee, or trustee in 
bankruptcy.”  J.A. 91.  Of course, none of these enumerated 
relationships apply to Sunoco, and Sunoco is not even 
mentioned in the Cardholder Agreement.  Additionally, while 
the enumerated items are preceded by “such as,” the 
relationships listed evoke far closer connections — ones where 
rights and obligations are intertwined and where liability may 
be shared — than the one that Sunoco purports to have with 
Citibank in this case.  The clause read in context suggests that 
the parties did not intend for it to govern an entity with merely 
a marketing relationship with Citibank.  See, e.g., Opperman 
v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 566 N.W.2d 487, 490 (S.D. 1997) 
(“Under the canon of noscitur a sociis, words take import from 
each other.  This maxim of interpretation is ‘wisely applied 
where a word [or phrase] is capable of many meanings in order 
to avoid the giving of unintended breadth’ to contract 
provisions.” (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 
303, 307 (1961))).  Nor does Sunoco advance any rationale for 
why its marketing agreement with Citibank confers on it a 
close enough relationship to merit coverage by this clause.  In 
the absence of a rationale or limiting principle for when a 
relationship between businesses is too tenuous to render them 
“connected” under this arbitration clause, we cannot hold that 
White’s claims against Sunoco in this case are covered by the 
arbitration clause. 
                                              
intent of the contracting parties and enforce choice of law 
provisions in contracts executed by them.”). 
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* * * * * * 
 
The FAA “simply requires courts to enforce privately 
negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in 
accordance with their terms.”  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of 
Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989).  
Its “primary purpose” is to ensure that private agreements to 
arbitrate between parties “are enforced according to their 
terms.”  Id. at 479.  The Cardholder Agreement is a contract 
between White and Citibank, and not Sunoco.  Without a 
contractual basis or equitable principles directing us to enforce 
the agreement in this dispute between White and Sunoco, a 
third party, we cannot compel arbitration.11  
 
V. 
 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order denying Sunoco’s motion to compel arbitration. 
 
                                              
11 We also reject Sunoco’s argument that the District Court 
should have conducted a summary trial on the issue of whether 
Sunoco and Citibank jointly marketed the Sunoco Rewards 
Card.  The District Court acknowledged this issue as a disputed 
fact and correctly concluded that disposition does not turn on 
its resolution. 
White v. Sunoco Inc. 
No. 16-2808 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
This case involves a single contract about a hybrid 
product:  the Sunoco Rewards Card, a promotional credit card 
offered jointly by Sunoco and Citibank.  As a matter of basic 
contract law, because White’s claims fall squarely within, and 
arise out of, the broad terms of the integrated contract 
between White, Sunoco, and Citibank, Sunoco should be able 
to compel arbitration.  Unfortunately, in examining the 
boundaries of arbitrability, the majority has failed to 
appreciate precepts of contract law that establish that Sunoco 
is a party to the single contract at issue here.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent.   
 
I.1 
As a threshold issue, the promotional materials2 and 
the Sunoco Rewards Card Agreement form an integrated 
                                              
1 I agree with the majority’s choice of law analysis and will 
accordingly apply Florida and South Dakota law.   
2 The majority’s characterization of the promotional materials 
as parol evidence misses the point.  Maj. at 17.  The 
promotional materials are not used to interpret an ambiguous 
term in an otherwise complete contract; rather, the 
promotional materials are themselves part of the complete 
Sunoco Rewards Card contract.   
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contract between White, Citibank and Sunoco.3  This is clear 
from the process, outlined in the promotional materials, 
which, Sunoco asserts, were prepared jointly by Sunoco and 
Citibank together.4  To obtain a Sunoco Rewards Card, a 
consumer first receives the promotional materials, which 
advertise the fuel discount and include selected terms and 
conditions, such as procedures for claiming rewards and 
annual percentage rates for various transactions.5  The 
promotional materials explicitly mention that additional terms 
and conditions will be sent if customers are approved for the 
card.6  The promotional pamphlet also includes an application 
for customers to fill out and return to Citibank.  Citibank then 
processes this application and gathers information about the 
applicant to verify identity and eligibility for credit.  If the 
application is approved, Citibank sends the applicant a 
Sunoco Rewards Card, along with the Card Agreement 
containing additional terms and conditions.  Sunoco and 
Citibank are then responsible for effectuating the discount on 
Sunoco gasoline purchases, made using the card.  Indeed, 
when White complained to Citibank about discount credits he 
                                              
3 Whether this is so is a question of law for the courts.  Baker 
v. Wilburn, 456 N.W.2d 304, 306 (S.D. 1990) (“The effects 
and terms of a contract are questions of law to be resolved by 
the court.” (citations omitted)).   
4 Certainly, Sunoco would not have engaged in such a 
promotion of a Citibank credit card without Citibank’s full 
knowledge and agreement. 
5 JA 44-46, 51-52. 
6 JA 44, 52 (“When you become a cardmember, you will 
receive the full Sunoco Rewards Card Program Terms and 
Conditions, which may change at any time for any reason 
upon thirty (30) days prior written notice.”).   
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did not receive for Sunoco gas purchases, White received 
credit on his Citibank card,7 as the discount may be received 
at the pump or credited to the Citibank billing statement.8 
 
Basic contract law dictates that this process cannot 
create two separate contracts.  Promotional materials are 
generally not considered offers that can be accepted through 
application, especially when the application is explicitly 
subject to approval.9  Here, the promotional materials were 
clear that mailing in the application would not create a 
contract, noting that Citibank would have to screen the 
applicant’s creditworthiness.  As such, this process cannot 
create two separate contracts.   
 
Insofar as the majority holds that there is only one 
valid contract—the Card Agreement between White and 
Citibank—with terms independent from those specified in the 
promotional materials,10 this analysis is not supported by 
Florida and South Dakota law.  Both Florida and South 
Dakota law allow multiple documents to constitute a single 
contract.  The Florida Supreme Court has held that “a 
                                              
7 Maj. at 4, fn. 1. 
8  JA 44, 52. 
9 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 26 (1981) (“A 
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an 
offer if the person to whom it is addressed knows or has 
reason to know that the person making it does not intend to 
conclude a bargain until he has made a further manifestation 
of assent.”). 
10 Maj. at 16 (“Sunoco has also conceded that there are no 
terms to ‘integrate’ with the actual contract at issue:  the Card 
Agreement.”). 
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complete contract may be gathered from letters, writings and 
telegrams between the parties relating to the subject-matter of 
the contract, and so connected with each other that they may 
be fairly said to constitute one paper.”11  Similarly, the South 
Dakota Supreme Court has held that “a contract may consist 
of several writings and all writings must be read together to 
determine the terms of the agreement.”12  Notably, the 
writings need not themselves be contracts.13    
 
Florida and South Dakota have each articulated 
standards for construing multiple documents together as one 
contract.  The Florida Supreme Court will read multiple 
instruments as one contract where “[t]he instruments in 
writing which allegedly constitute a valid contract . . . specify 
                                              
11 Webster Lumber Co. v. Lincoln, 115 So. 498, 502 (Fla. 
1927) (citations omitted). 
12 Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. Hauff, 668 N.W.2d 528, 534 (S.D. 
2003).   
13 While most such cases involve multiple contracts, the 
South Dakota Supreme Court has construed non-contract 
writings as part of a contract in at least one case.  In Citibank 
(S.D.), N.A. v. Hauff, the South Dakota Supreme Court held 
that the expiration language on credit cards were part of 
Citibank’s credit card agreement.  668 N.W.2d at 534.  The 
language on the credit cards was not a separate contract, but 
merely a writing indicating when the card would expire.  
However, the court held that “the entire agreement between 
the parties included the language on the card itself.”  Id.  The 
Florida Supreme Court likewise frequently construes letters 
or telegrams together to constitute a contract.  See, e.g., 
Mehler v. Huston, 57 So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. 1952) (collecting 
cases). 
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the terms and conditions definitely and certainly.”14  The 
South Dakota Supreme Court has specified that “[a]ll writings 
that are executed together as part of a single transaction are to 
be interpreted together”15 so that “the intent of the parties will 
be preserved and enforced.”16  Writings are more likely to be 
part of a single transaction when one is dependent upon the 
execution of the other.17   
 
Here, the promotional materials and Card Agreement 
together state the definite terms of the contract and are clearly 
part of a single transaction; accordingly, both should be 
considered together as one contract.  The documents evince 
the parties’ intent for the documents to be read together as 
one contract.  First, only when read together do the 
promotional materials and the Card Agreement state the 
definite terms of the Sunoco Rewards Card.  Without the 
promotional materials, White would not know what discount 
he was entitled to through his Sunoco Rewards Card.  
Without the Card Agreement, White would not know the 
complete terms and conditions binding the card, including the 
methods for calculating daily minimums or procedures for 
addressing discrepancies on a billing statement.   
 
Second, the fact that the promotional materials and 
Card Agreement are part of a single transaction is shown 
through the internal references to, and dependence between, 
                                              
14 Id. at 837.   
15 Baker, 456 N.W.2d at 306 (citation omitted). 
16 First Trust & Sav. Bank v. McVeigh, 211 N.W. 446, 447 
(S.D. 1926). 
17 Kramer v. William F. Murphy Self-Declaration of Trust, 
816 N.W.2d 813, 815 (S.D. 2012). 
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the documents.  The promotional materials clearly refer to the 
Card Agreement in setting out the entire process which would 
create the Sunoco Rewards Card Contract.18  While the Card 
Agreement does not explicitly mention the promotional 
materials, the Card Agreement is sent in accordance with the 
process specified in the promotional materials.  Moreover, the 
documents are dependent on one another:  without accepting 
the subsequent Card Agreement, an applicant would not be 
entitled to the fuel discount discussed in the promotional 
materials.  Without filling out the application in the 
promotional materials, applicants would not receive the Card 
Agreement.  Under either Florida or South Dakota law, the 
promotional materials and Card Agreement accordingly must 
be read together as an integrated contract between White, 
Sunoco, and Citibank.   
 
II. 
Following then from the conclusion that there is but 
one contract here -- the contract between White, Sunoco and 
Citibank made up of the promotional materials and the Card 
Agreement – Sunoco, as a party to the contract, is in a 
position to exercise the provisions of the contract.  The plain 
language of the contract allows Sunoco to compel arbitration 
of White’s claims.   
 
The majority, however, relies on the clause stating that 
“[e]ither you or we may, without the other’s consent, elect 
mandatory, binding arbitration[,]”19—along with the 
contract’s definition of “you” as White and “we” as 
                                              
18 JA 44, 52.   
19 JA 91. 
7 
 
Citibank20—to allow only White and Citibank to arbitrate.  
However, this reading is flawed for two reasons.  First, this 
clause itself is not framed exclusively.  Second, the rest of the 
contract undercuts this interpretation.  Following the 
purportedly limiting clause, the Cardholder Agreement lists 
as arbitrable any claim which is “[n]ot only ours and yours, 
but also Claims made by or against anyone connected with us 
or you or claiming through us or you[.]”21  The contract 
further holds that the arbitration clause is explicitly to be 
interpreted “in the broadest way the law will allow it to be 
enforced.”22  Thus, the contract, read as a whole, does not 
restrict the ability to arbitrate to only White and Citibank.   
 
The majority next holds that Sunoco is not sufficiently 
“connected with” Citibank to render its claims arbitrable.  
Based on the examples listed in the clause, the majority 
opines that sufficient relationships are those “where rights 
and obligations are intertwined and where liability may be 
shared[;]” relative to such relationships, Sunoco’s “merely . . . 
marketing relationship” with Citibank is insufficient.23  This 
is both an overstatement of the necessary relationship and an 
understatement of the relationship between Sunoco and 
Citibank.  At least some of the examples from the clause, 
such as an “affiliated company,” do not necessarily share 
obligations or liability.  Moreover, Sunoco and Citibank share 
more than “a marketing relationship.”  In operating the 
Rewards Card, Sunoco and Citibank’s functions are closely 
intertwined:  Sunoco promulgated some of the terms and 
                                              
20 JA 88. 
21 JA 91.  
22 JA 91. 
23 Maj. at 19.   
8 
 
conditions that govern the use of the Rewards Card and these 
rewards are, in some cases, credited directly to the statement 
balance issued by Citibank.  Indeed, the card is called the 
Sunoco Rewards Card.  There is no entity more “connected 
with” Citibank in this endeavor than Sunoco.   
 
While brief excerpts of the Card Agreement can be 
narrowly read to support the majority’s interpretation, when 
read as a whole the contract clearly evince an intent to allow 
Sunoco to compel arbitration.   
 
III. 
Finally, even if the plain language of the contract did 
not allow Sunoco to compel arbitration, Sunoco may do so if 
“‘traditional principles’ of state law allow a contract to be 
enforced by or against nonparties to the contract.”24  I agree 
that Florida law would recognize equitable estoppel as a 
ground for nonsignatories to bind signatories if, in relevant 
part, “the claim ‘arise[s] out of or relate[s] to’ the agreement 
containing the arbitration provision.”25  South Dakota’s 
standard for equitable estoppel is a little different; while not 
phrased as equitable estoppel, the South Dakota Supreme 
                                              
24 Griswold v. Coventry First LLC, 762 F.3d 264, 271 (3d Cir. 
2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
25 Rolls-Royce PLC v. Royal Caribbean Cruises LTD., 960 
So. 2d 768, 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).  As the majority 
notes, there is a second circumstance in which a nonsignatory 
can compel arbitration:  when a signatory and nonsignatory 
engage in concerted misconduct.  Op. 12-13.  I agree with the 
majority’s rejection of this ground, however, as it is clear that 
this exception is not applicable here.   
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Court noted that “[i]t would be manifestly unfair to allow 
[plaintiffs] to assert claims arising out of agreements against 
nonsignatories to those agreements without allowing those 
[defendants] [also to] invoke the arbitration clause contained 
in the agreements.”26  Both standards require that the claim 
“arise out of” the underlying agreement.   
 
While the majority holds that White’s claims do not 
rely on any terms in the Card Agreement, since the 
underlying contract encompasses both the promotional 
materials and the Card Agreement, White’s claims clearly do.  
White’s claims arise out of the terms of the fuel discount, 
which are outlined in the promotional materials.  Since the 
promotional materials are part of the same contract as the 
arbitration clause, White’s claims “arise out of” the 
underlying agreement, and Sunoco can compel arbitration 
based on equitable estoppel.   
 
IV. 
At issue is an attempt to bypass, through artful 
pleading, a valid agreement to arbitrate.  Clever framing, 
however, cannot obfuscate the intent of the parties upon 
creation of the contract.  Given that there is an integrated 
agreement between White, Sunoco, and Citibank, I would 
hold that, either under the plain terms of the contract or 
through equitable estoppel, Sunoco can compel arbitration of 
the claims brought against it.  I respectfully dissent.   
 
                                              
26 Rossi, 648 N.W.2d at 815 (alterations in original) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
